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I 
Introduction
Though the language of ‘intentional act’, ‘intentional object’ and ‘inten-
tional indwelling’ is of medieval-scholastic origin, the contemporary view 
that consciousness is intentional is a recent arrival in philosophy of mind. 
And it is generally well known and accepted that it was Franz Brentano 
who is initially responsible for this when, in his study Psychology From 
an Empirical Standpoint (PES), first published in 1874, he re-introduced 
and appealed to ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle-ages called the inten-
tional in-existence of an object’ to describe what he took to be the kind of 
existence that distinguishes the objects of our consciousness from things 
that exist extra-mentally (Brentano 1995, 88). Regardless, therefore, of la-
ter disputes among his followers over whether their respective versions of 
‘Brentano’s thesis’, as commentators often call it today (Moran 1996), were 
genuine heirs to Brentano’s original concept, or not (Bartok 2005), at the 
time of his writing of PES Brentano believed that he had not discovered 
anything new about consciousness, professing instead his concurrence with 
Medieval-Scholastic thinkers, and he re-affirms this agreement in a note 
which he added to a re-issue of part of PeS In 1911.1 No-one, however, is an 
authority in the interpretation of a text; and this includes the interpretation 
of one’s own text. Behind the terminological agreement on intentionality 
that exists between Brentano and the Scholastics there are major and real 
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substantial differences in their respective concepts of intentionality (De 
Boer 1978, 40–51). Thus Bartok’s (2005, 454) reiteration that ‘(H)e [Bren-
tano] insisted that the central doctrines of his psychology, the doctrines of 
intentionality and inner perception, were doctrines that had clear prece-
dents in the work of Aristotle and the Scholastics’, is just that, a reiteration 
of Brentano’s own and often misleading self-interpretation. Yet Brentano 
clearly subscribes to at least part of the meaning of the original Scholastic 
concept in his understanding of the objects of consciousness in PES. Un-
less we can ascertain, therefore, both which part of the original meaning of 
the Scholastic concept that Brentano adheres to and what new meaning he 
gives to the concept of ‘intentional inexistence’ in his 1874 study, it will be 
difficult to understand and assess ‘Brentano’s thesis’ of intentionality; or, at 
least, so shall I argue in this paper.2 
A complicating factor, however, in both understanding and assessing 
‘Brentano’s thesis’ of intentionality in PeS Is that sometime after the pub-
li cation of PES Brentano (1995b) begins to use the term ‘intentional’ to 
describe not only the objects of consciousness but also the relation of the acts 
of consciousness to their objects in his lecture-courses on Descriptive Psycho-
logy (DP), which he delivered at Vienna University from the mid-1880s and 
into the early 1890s, stressing this as the defining feature of consciousness, 
for, as he now instructs his students, 
the peculiarity which, above all, is generally characteristic of [human] con-
sciousness, is that it shows always and everywhere, i.e. in each of its sepa-
rable parts, a certain kind of relation, relating a subject to an object. This 
relation is also referred to as ‘intentional relation’ (intentionale Beziehung). 
To every consciousness belongs essentially a relation. […] The one correlate 
is the act of consciousness; the other is that which it is directed upon. (DP, 
23) 
During this period, then, Brentano held not one but two theses of intention-
ality, one concerning the ‘intentional relation’ of the acts of consciousness 
to their objects and another concerning the ‘intentional inexistence’ of ob-
jects in consciousness. Brentano, nevertheless, claims no originality for this 
view of the ‘intentional relation’ of the acts of consciousness to their objects 
either. Again, he attributes it to Aristotle, saying, 
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as highlighted already by Aristotle, the correlates display the peculiarity 
that the one alone [the act of consciousness] is real, whereas the other [the 
object of consciousness] is not something real (nichts Reales). (DP, 24) 
Brentano, alas, does not tell his students where exactly he found this noti-
on of the ‘intentional relation’ of the acts of consciousness to their (inten-
tional) objects in Aristotle. In the ‘Editors’ Notes’, however, to Brentano’s 
allusion to Aristotle’s source in these lectures, Baumgartner and Chisholm 
(DP 180, n. 9) remark that here, ‘Brentano is evidently referring to Meta-
physics, 1021 a, 30’. This indeed is in keeping with a similar citation given 
by Brentano for his use of the concept of ‘intentional relation’ in a public 
lecture which he delivered around this time (on 23 January 1889) before the 
Vienna Law Society entitled ‘The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and 
Wrong’, and which he published later in that year (Brentano 1969, 14, n. 
19). In this lecture, he tells his audience,
The common feature of everything psychological often referred to, unfor-
tunately, by the misleading term ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein), consists in a 
relation that we bear to an object. The relation has been called intentional; it 
is a relation to something which may not be actual but which is presented 
as an object. There is no hearing unless something is heard, no believing 
unless something is believed; there is no hoping unless something is hoped 
for, no striving unless there is something that is striven for; one cannot be 
pleased unless there is something that one is pleased about; and so on, for 
all the other psychological phenomena. (Ibid. my emphasis) 
In a note added to the published text of this lecture about his use of this 
term ‘intentional’, Brentano remarks that ‘(T)he expression “intentional”, 
like many other of our more important concepts, comes from the Scho-
lastics’, citing Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15, 1021a 29. This 
Aristotelian reference, however, is to the concept of the abstracted form of 
sense that resides intentionally in the intellectual part of the human soul, 
that is to say, about the ‘intentional object’, and not about an ‘intentional re-
lation’ of the acts to that object which is the thesis that Brentano is emphasizing 
in his 1889 lecture and in DP. By glossing over the thesis of the intentional 
relation of the act (of consciousness) with the thesis concerning the mode 
of being of the intentional object of consciousness Brentano, therefore, 
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 elides the difference between both of these tenets. Furthermore, there are 
major conceptual differences between Aristotle’s account of this ‘relation’ 
in the Metaphysics and Brentano’s account in DP and in The Origin of our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong. We thus have to look outside of the actual 
Aristotelian passage to which Brentano alludes in order to follow Brentano’s 
understanding of the ‘intentional relation’ of the acts of our consciousness to 
their (intentional) objects. This, nevertheless, probably explains why com-
mentators and critics (Tancred-Lawson 1986; Sorabji 1991) of ‘Brentano’s 
thesis’ cannot find and have not found any direct textual clues in the actual 
passage from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or in any other similar passages from 
Aristotle’s De Anima to which Brentano also alludes in PES (1995, 88–89, 
n.), that would assist them in understanding Brentano’s understanding of 
the ‘intentional relation’ which he claims Aristotle to hold between acts of 
consciousness and their objects. 
Brentano’s use of the term ‘intentional’, therefore, both as an adverb 
qualifying the activity of the relation of the acts of consciousness to their 
objects in consciousness and as an adjective qualifying the mode of being 
that the objects of consciousness enjoy in consciousness complicates consid-
erably the view of ‘Brentano’s thesis’ of intentionality as one thesis. It also 
adds extra hermeneutic difficulties to the story about its Scholastic heritage 
that is already complicated enough in the 1874 study.3 
In his lectures on DP, nonetheless, Brentano would like us to believe 
that both of these features, the intentional relation of consciousness to its 
objects and the intentional objects of consciousness, express one thing about 
our consciousness, and that both of these features — the ‘intentional relation’ 
of the acts of consciousness to their objects and the ‘intentional inexistence 
of an object’ in consciousness — are doctrines that are originally found in 
Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy with which he is in entire agreement. 
This, nevertheless, is not the case as there are many divergences between 
Brentano’s thesis of intentionality and the way in which the Scholastics held 
that a human act can be said to be intentionally related to an object and the 
way in which an object can be said to have an intentional mode of existence 
(as opposed to a real mode of existence) in another object. In this paper, I 
will not attempt any comprehensive analysis of both of these original Scho-
lastic concepts in relation to ‘Brentano’s thesis’, but focus only on some of 
the major points of similarities and differences between ‘Brentano’s thesis’ 
and the Scholastic concepts that are of most relevance to an understanding 
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and evaluation of ‘Brentano’s thesis of intentionality’. Even within these 
limits, this issue admits of impressive intricacy and complexity.
II 
Similarities and Differences Between Brentano and the Scholastics in  
Concepts of the Intentional Relation of Acts to Objects
The Scholastics did not (and could not) hold the view that all of ‘our psy-
chological phenomena’ or ‘conscious acts’ bear an intentional relation to 
their objects in the way in which Brentano suggests in his 1889 lecture and 
his lectures on ‘Descriptive Psychology’. The Scholastics, for example, did 
not regard our acts of sensation as bearing an intentional relation to their 
objects. Aristotle and the Scholastics, rather, argued that when a human 
being touches a ‘physical thing’ in the ‘external world’, the potencies of the 
sensitive soul (anima sensitiva) of that living being are activated, resulting in 
acts of sensation for that individual being.4 This encounter between ‘phy-
sical things in the external world’ and ‘the embodied sensitive soul of the 
human being’ demonstrates for Aristotle and the Medieval Aristotelians 
the corporeal nature of the sensitive soul (in the human being) – a view 
that Brentano defends with admirable clarity in his 1866 habilitation thesis 
on The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, 
but one to which he no longer subscribes in his 1874 PES. Through his 
reading of ‘English empiricists’ and ‘modern English philosophers’, Bren-
tano (1995a, xxviii, 11), now in agreement with Locke, takes sensation to 
be acts of sense judgement that have their own particular objects, such as, for 
instance, a sound I hear, a colour I see, an odour I smell, warmth felt, and 
so forth. These objects, he calls ‘physical phenomena’ (not ‘physical things’) 
in PES and DP, and these ‘objects’ of sensation have a subjective mode of 
existence only, for, 
John Locke once conducted an experiment in which, after having warmed 
one of his hands and cooled the other, he immersed both of them simul-
taneously in the same basin of water. He experienced warmth in one hand 
and cold in the other, and thus proved that neither warmth nor cold really 
existed in the water. (Brentano 1995a, 6)
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By the time Brentano had undertaken his study of empirical psychology 
in the 1870s, therefore, it is fair to say that he had jettisoned philosophically 
much of his earlier Aristotelian-Scholastic view of psychology and appro-
priated, in its place, a Lockean-Humean approach to ‘psychology’, where 
the twin sources of all our knowledge-claims, as Locke argued, come from 
‘sensation’ and ‘reflection’, or, as Brentano puts it in PES (1995a, 77), from 
the ‘outer [sense] perception of our physical phenomena’ (what Locke calls 
‘sensory ideas’ and Descartes calls ‘adventitious ideas’) and the ‘inner per-
ception of our own psychical phenomena’,5 a position that Brentano never 
subsequently gave up, but re-iterates in the last year of his life in 1917.6 
For the Scholastics, however, only acts of the will are characteristically 
directed towards their own objects (tendere in aliud). As St Thomas says, 
‘Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in aliud tendere’.7 From an Aristo-
telian-Scholastic point of view, then, it is only those acts over which I have 
some degree of control in bringing about and which I execute with at least 
some degree of foresight that can be acts that ‘consist in a relation that we 
bear to an object’. The opposite of an intentional act, for the Scholastics, 
therefore, would be an act performed by an agent that had unintended out-
comes, or an act that is related to an outcome that has no intrinsic relation 
to the agent’s actual intention, such as, for instance, an act of sensation 
experienced when hitting one’s shin bone in tripping over a low table, or 
to use Brentano’s own example, taken from 1907, an act of wishing (velle) 
‘that the weather be good tomorrow’.8 Indeed this example of Brentano’s, 
for the sake of comparison with the Scholastic concept of an ‘intentional 
act’, is worth quoting in full. It reads: 
But wanting, willing, and desiring do not thus abstract from circumstances; 
they involve preference that takes into account whatever I happen to be 
aware of at that particular moment. It should be noted that I can thus want 
or desire a particular thing without at all believing it to be something I can 
bring about myself. I can want that the weather be good tomorrow, but I 
have no choice in that matter’ (ibid.) 
Having no choice in that matter — i.e. in weather conditions — would be 
suffice to rule out such wants as intentional acts of the will for St Tho-
mas and the Medieval Scholastics. That Brentano, therefore, considers 
this, ‘wanting the weather to be good tomorrow’, an intentional act because 
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the wish is directed towards something indicates a major difference between 
Brentano’s concept of an ‘intentional act’ of consciousness and what the 
Scholastics taught in relation to intentional acts of the will. 
Part of the very meaning and understanding of an intentional act of the 
will for the Scholastics, then, is that the end in view (intentio finis) is execut-
able by the agent.9 The intended goal (finis intentus) is an integral part of 
the ‘intentional activity (in-tentio)’ itself.10 Thus in this context, to say ‘I 
have an intention in mind’ simply means, for St Thomas, that ‘I intend to 
do something’, or to ‘refrain from doing something’. The crucial point in 
this theory of the ‘intentio (intentional activity)’ of the will is that the im-
manent intention of any particular act of the will is fulfilled when the action 
is completed. Thus it is only in the completion of the intended outcome of 
an action that the intention itself is fully revealed for what it is, and that the 
intention as such can be properly inferred and knowable either by me or 
by others, however difficult such ‘intent’ might be to prove or disprove in a 
court of law.11 Whether I manage to reach my objective, or are thwarted, for 
whatever reason, in reaching my objective, the intention (to do so) still ex-
ists. This is why, for Aquinas, the responsibility and morality of our ‘inten-
tions’ extends to and includes what resides inside and outside of the mind. 
Thus wishing someone ill (but not wishing that the weather to be good) 
and helping a person cross a busy road are both instances of ‘intentional 
acts’ for Aquinas. 
For Aquinas, then, it is only in those acts that are chosen and under-
taken by a free rational being that such activity is regarded ‘principaliter 
et proprie’ as intentional because it is only in those acts that the ‘intentio’ 
or intentional activity contains within itself its own causal efficacy, i.e., its 
self-directedness.12 When the Scholastics employed the term ‘intentional’ 
to describe the ‘relation we bear to an object’, it depicts the particular kind 
of self-directedness that characterizes exclusively the immanent striving of 
the activity of the will of a doer of an action towards her objectives (and the 
outcome of that action). This is why St Thomas concludes that ‘intentio’ or 
intentional activity is a property of the acts of our will: ‘intentio est proprie 
actus voluntatis.’13 Such intentional activity, then, is not a property of acts of 
sensation or of our acts of cognition. In Scholastic theory of knowledge intel-
ligibility is elicited from data presented by the knower through the exercise 
of the agent intellect. The outcome of this process results in a modification 
of the knower’s potential to become an actual knower of that-which-is-
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knowable. Thus before, during, and after this process, both the knower and 
that which is potentially intelligible retain their specific natures and their 
respective ontological integrities.14 The immanent ‘striving’ or ‘impulse af-
ter’ in achieving its own ends or goals (tendere in aliud) that is characteristic 
of the dynamic of the individual will, therefore, is not found in acts of the 
intellect. What is found, instead, is the abstractive action of its operations 
in discovering (in-venire) the truth of its knowledge-claims regarding what-
ever it is that is under consideration.
Brentano’s expressed view throughout the 1880s, 1890s and into the 
first decade of the 1900s, that all of our psychical-act experiences — acts 
of sensation, cognition and volition etc. — bear an immanent intentional 
relation to their respective objects deviates considerably, therefore, from 
the way in which the Scholastics both used and confined the meaning of the 
term ‘intentional’ to designate the directedness or object-relatedness that is 
characteristic of acts of the will only. Not surprisingly, Brentano’s expan-
sion of the term ‘intentional’ to include all psychical-act experiences that are 
discernible within human consciousness ‘led to his being grouped with the 
followers of Schopenhauer as a “hormic” psychologist, for whom “objects” 
are purposes, or ends, and “acts” are the impulses which strive towards 
those ends’.15 
Brentano, nevertheless, clearly means no such thing. His view, rather, is 
quite a straightforward one; but it does require that we confine our atten-
tion to a description of the way in which psychical-act experiences present 
themselves as acts that are specifically directed toward their objects. In other 
words, Brentano ‘thesis’ on the directedness of the acts of consciousness to-
wards their immediate objects is a strictly intuitive item of knowledge that 
is discoverable about consciousness itself from within reflection upon the 
nature of conscious acts themselves. This doctrine, in turn, presupposes a 
commitment to some version of what commentators today call ‘the trans-
parency doctrine of ideas’ in that it holds that the way in which we can know 
anything about our consciousness is by direct reflection on the activities of 
consciousness itself. This is the proposed avenue or approach to knowing 
anything about our experiences or conscious acts, terms that Brentano now 
accepts (following Locke) as ‘synonymous expressions’ in PES.16 And he 
continues within this approach in his 1889 lecture, re-assuring his audience 
that ‘(I)nner perception tells me that I am now having such-and-such sound 
or colour sensations, or that I am now thinking or willing this or that.’17 
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What Brentano acknowledges here, then, is that whilst we can attempt to 
order and classify our experiences (acts of sensation, cognition and volition 
etc) by the way in which these acts present their objects, naturally, in terms 
of acts of presentation, acts of judgment, and acts that take an interest in 
an object or that value something, we cannot call our experiences to order.18 
This is why, for Brentano, the intentional activity that marks the directed-
ness of a conscious act towards its object primarily depicts, as it did for 
Hume before him, the passive possession of the acts of its contents by the 
‘mentally active subject’.19 And in following this position, Brentano is also 
following Descartes and the latter’s empirical foundationalist starting point 
in Meditation II, where he maintains,
I am the same [one] who feels, that is to say, who perceives certain things, as by the 
organs of sense, since in truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said 
these phenomena are false and I am dreaming. Let it be so; still [and here is the impor-
tant passage to note] it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I 
hear noise, and that I feel heat. That cannot be false [doubted].20 
It is from within this Cartesian frame of reference, of what commentators 
now-a-days refer to as ‘basic empirical beliefs’ — and not from outside of this 
frame of reference — that Brentano distinguishes the ‘physical phenomenon’ 
(a sound) from the ‘psychical phenomenon’ (the act of hearing). In the real-
ity of the ‘actual experience’, then, Brentano identifies an immediately dis-
cernible ‘natural’ and ‘real’ unity between the act of hearing and its (intend-
ed) object within the particular experience itself.21 Thus it turns out to be 
the case, for Brentano, that ‘the object of an inner perception is simply [the 
existence of] a psychical phenomenon, and the object of an outer [sensory] 
perception is simply [the existence of] a physical phenomenon, a sound, 
odour or the like’.22 None of this, nevertheless, points to what resides out-
side of the actual experiences of the ‘mentally active subject’. It is a distinc-
tion that occurs within the experiencing itself. And this is why Brentano 
can (famously) say in PES that what characterises ‘psychical phenomena’ 
is the ‘intentional’ or ‘mental’ or ‘immanent objectivity’ that is present in 
‘psychical acts’ or ‘psychical phenomena’, where ‘intentional’, ‘mental’ and 
‘immanent objectivity’ are synonymous expressions indicating the passive 
possession of the actual acts of consciousness of their objects.
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Because all psychical-act experiences evidently bear an intuitively de-
monstrable structural relatedness (a directedness) to their objects, Husserl, 
therefore, is correct in his assessment of ‘Brentano’s thesis’ that Brenta-
no is justified, from a descriptive-psychological methodological point of 
view, in borrowing and revaluing the term ‘intentional’ from the Scholastic 
theory of the object-relatedness of acts of the will to describe the ‘relation 
we bear [in consciousness] to an object’ as a way of defining the activity 
of consciousness itself — though Brentano himself thinks he is borrowing the 
term ‘intentional’ from an aspect connected to the object-relatedness of acts 
of cognition which he claims to have found in Scholastic epistemology. In 
this ‘revaluation’ (Umwertung) and ‘discovery’ of the ‘object-relatedness’ of 
experiences, nonetheless, Brentano becomes ‘the pathfinder’ (Wegbereiter) 
in instigating a new descriptive-psychological science of intentional con-
sciousness and its objectivities (Husserl 1977, 31–35). In this regard, there-
fore, it is fair to conclude that Brentano, unbeknownst to himself, is not de-
viating from the Scholastics in either the meaning or use of the well-known 
Scholastic term ‘intentional’ (when it is used to qualify acts of the will) to 
describe the immanent self-directedness of psychical-act experiences toward 
their objects, or the referential characteristic, what commentators today call 
the ‘aboutness’ of consciousness. What this tenet of the intentional relation 
(intentionale Beziehung) of the acts consciousness to their objects amounts 
to philosophically in terms of either realism or idealism, nevertheless, still 
figures contentiously in the dispute among Brentano’s critics about both 
the proper interpretation and the correct evaluation of ‘Brentano’s thesis’. 
Whether, for example, that which is intended through acts of outer per-
ceptual-sense experience is an existing extra-mental physical thing, or an 
immanent so-called sensorially perceivable sense quality, or whether we 
should (or can) methodologically ‘bracket’ all hypothetical-metaphysical as-
sumptions about the existing ‘thing in-itself’, outside of one’s own actual 
experiencing, in any phenomenological description of ‘the thing itself’ are 
problems that dogged both the interpretation and the elaboration of the 
thesis of intentionality concerning the ‘intentional relation’ of acts to their 
objects. To address this issue in Brentano’s thesis, however, we have to re-
turn to and assess the thesis on intentionality that Brentano elaborates in his 
1874 study, the one concerning the immanence of objects in consciousness.
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III 
Similarities and Differences Between Brentano and the Scholastics in  
Concepts of the Intentional In-existence of an Object
In his famous and often-quoted 1874 passage of PES, Brentano writes:
Every psychical phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Mid-
dle Ages called the [1] intentional (and also [2] mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, [4] relation to a content, 
[5] direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a 
thing), or an [3] immanent objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit). Every psychical pheno-
menon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in 
the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is 
affirmed [as true] or denied [as false], in love [something is] loved [correctly or in-
correctly], in hate [something is] hated, in desire [something is] desired and so on.23
Commentators have found any number of theses defining the psychical 
in this passage, from one to four, and some critics (Caston 1995, 217) sug-
gest that Brentano is not offering us any definition of intentionality at all, 
but ‘(I)nstead, he appeals to medieval terminology to indicate what he is 
talking about and then, by way of explication, offers three glosses of his 
own: (i) possessing content, (ii) being directed upon an object, and (iii) 
 having the object present in the act. All three are metaphorical — in fact, the 
first appeals to the very same metaphor as the third.’ In the 1874 passage, 
none theless, Brentano, employs no less than ‘five typifying expressions’ in 
his definition of psychical-act experiences: every psychical phenomenon 
is characterised by the (1) ‘intentional inexistence of an object’, (2) ‘mental 
inexistence of an object’, (3) ‘immanent objectivity’, (4) ‘relation to a con-
tent’, and (5) ‘direction toward an object’.24 Expressions (1), (2) and (3) are, 
as de Boer remarks, ‘fully synonymous’ in that they all point to the fact 
that psychical-act experiences ‘include a content’, and that ‘(T)his content 
is more precisely defined as intentional or immanent or mental’.25 Expres-
sions (4) and (5) are different aspects of psychical-act experiences. They 
are concerned with the directedness (Richtung, Beziehung) of a psychical-act 
experience toward an object or a content. Twenty years later, one of Bren-
tano’s students, Kazimierz Twardowski (1894), would distinguish ‘relation 
to a [mental] content’ and ‘direction towards an [extra mental] object’ in the 
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presentations (Vorstellungen) of consciousness as a double intentionality in 
his Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen — hence the plural 
Vorstellungen in this title — but in Brentano’s 1874 passage in PES Brentano 
understands these expressions of (4) ‘relation to a content’ and (5) ‘direc-
tion toward an object’ to be describing the same kind of thing; namely, the 
relatedness that is characteristic of the activity of psychical-act experiences 
themselves toward their objects.26 Thus Passmore (1957, 178) is correct to 
note that in the 1874 passage Brentano takes ‘these phrases [(4) and (5)]’ 
concerning the directedness (Richtung, Beziehung) of a psychical-act expe-
rience toward an object or a content ‘to be synonymous’. 
Spiegelberg (1994, 37), therefore, is correct to point out that in the 1874 
passage Brentano identifies not one, as he says, but two distinguishing 
 features of the psychical, the immanence of objects in consciousness and 
the directedness of psychical-act experiences towards objects. And this ex-
plains why Brentano could retain the second thesis of intentionality, de-
noting the directedness or relatedness of consciousness to its objects (how-
ever the latter are to be understood) after he rejected the first thesis of 
intentionality denoting the immanence of objects in consciousness ‘during 
what Brentano scholars call the crisis of immanence (‘Immanenzkrise’) of 
1905’ (Spiegelberg ibid., 48, n. 19).27
At the time, however, of his writing of PES and in his lecture-courses on 
DP at Vienna University, Brentano held both of these theses together as ex-
pressing the same time, namely, that the ‘intentional relation’ that exists in 
conscious acts both contains and bears the objects that exist inten tionally in 
those acts, for, as he elucidates in DP (24), ‘A person who is being thought 
(ein gedachter Mensch) is as little something real as a person who has ceased 
to be.’ When Brentano declares that the ‘correlates [of the acts of conscious-
ness and its objects] display the peculiarity that the one alone is real [= the 
psychical act], [whereas] the other [the intended object of consciousness] 
is not something real (nichts Reales)’ (ibid.), this distinction is about the 
experience itself. From a strict descriptive-psychological point of view, the 
only things that really and truly exist as they actually are and actually are as 
they are perceived in consciousness are one’s own actual psychical-act ex-
periences and their intentional objects. The relation between consciousness 
and its objectivities, as far as Brentano is concerned in his DP lectures, is 
entirely intra-psychical just as it was earlier in his 1874 passage from PES. 
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In ‘Brentano’s thesis’ of intentionality, therefore, the arrow of inten-
tionality, as the metaphor would have it and that many commentators use 
to elucidate ‘Brentano’s thesis’, does not reach outside of my actual cons-
ciousness itself but extends to and includes only my own actual experiences 
themselves and the merely phenomenal existence of ‘physical phenomena’ 
(qua sensorially perceivable qualities of an actual experience, e.g., a colour 
I am seeing, a sound I actually am hearing, warmth I am feeling, etc.,) and 
all other intended mental objects of all other acts of consciousness from 
love and hate, to logical judgements and ethical evaluations and so forth 
(Brentano 1995a, 155–76). What this thesis of intentionality emphasizes 
is the relatedness of our ‘acts of consciousness’ or ‘psychical phenomena’ 
or ‘psychological phenomena’ — terms which Brentano takes to be all sy-
nonymous expressions, whatever about his reservations in his 1889 lecture 
about using the misleading term of ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein) — to their 
objects and in particular the peculiar ontological status that those objects 
enjoy as the directly intended objects of the actual acts themselves.28 What 
this account of ‘intentionality’ holds is that if we do not start from the out-
set by taking the term ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein) as denoting the existen-
tial fact that consciousness is always a consciousness of something, then we 
will be misled by the term into thinking that consciousness, in its actuality, 
is some thing other than that; that is to say, that one’s own actual cons-
ciousness is something that has no intrinsic bearing on the objects of which 
consciousness is a consciousness. Later Husserl (1913) in his elaboration 
of his idea of transcendental phenomenology would present a (in)famous 
apodictic argument demonstrating the relativity of the very existence of the 
entire world of things given to our acts of outer perceptual-sense experi-
ence on the harmony of one’s own actual intentional consciousness.
The adaptation and extension of the Scholastic concept of the object-
relatedness of acts of the will to the object-relatedness of all of our ex-
periences or conscious acts is probably ‘the thesis’ of intentionality that 
is most stressed by followers and critics alike in ‘Brentano’s thesis’. This, 
nevertheless, is not the Scholastic concept of intentionality that Brentano 
actually uses (and modifies) in his 1874 psychology. Brentano is rather quite 
clear in which concept from the Medieval-Scholastic tradition he is bor-
rowing in his 1874 study; it is ‘the intentional in-existence of an object’ in 
consciousness, and not the relation of the act to its object or the object-
relatedness of the acts of consciousness, that best captures the essence of 
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consciousness, for, as he writes in the immediate paragraph following the 
famous 1874 passage,
This intentional in-existence (intentionale Inexistenz) is characteristic exclusively 
of psychical phenomena. No physical phenomena exhibit anything like it. We can, 
therefore, define psychical phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena 
which contain an object intentionally within themselves.29 
And again, he tells us later in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint that, 
‘we use the term “consciousness” to refer to any psychical phenomenon, 
insofar as it has a content.’30 
In his 1874 study Brentano is thoroughly aware of the fact that this par-
ticular Medieval-Aristotelian Scholastic concept of ‘intentional in-existence’ is 
one that is not well-known in everyday discourse, or one with which con-
temporary psychologists, lawyers, or natural scientists are familiar, for, as 
he explicitly remarks, later on in PES, in relation to the difficulty of settling 
disputes over both the meaning and the referent of the term ‘consciousness’ 
(‘Bewuβtsein’),
In the first place […] the term ‘consciousness,’ since it refers to an object which con-
sciousness is conscious of (‘von welchem das Bewuβtsein Bewuβtsein ist’), [it] seems 
to be appropriate to characterise psychical phenomena [conscious acts] precisely 
in terms of its [consciousness’s] distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of 
the intentional in-existence of an object, for which we lack a word in common usage.31 
Whatever about Brentano’s remarkable attempt both to see and to find lit-
eral corroboration of the defining feature of consciousness, ‘the intentional 
in-existence of an object’, in the German word itself — in this instance he 
clearly means that the state of being aware qua content is what conscious-
ness is a consciousness of, as the term ‘Bewuβt-sein’, being conscious, indi-
cates32 — Brentano is quite correct to note that this terminology of ‘inten-
tional in-existence of an object’ is one that is not ‘in common usage’. 
Regarding his own use and understanding of this concept of ‘intentional 
in-existence’, Brentano believes that he is in agreement with Aristotle’s po-
sition on this matter, explicitly indicating to his reader in the extended note 
which he added to the 1874 passage, 
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Aristotle himself spoke of this psychical indwelling (psychische Einwohnung). In his 
books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; 
that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which 
is thought is in the thinking intellect.33
And in another note, added this time by Brentano to a re-issue of part of 
his PeS In 1911, he explicitly complains about his critics’ confusion and 
misunderstanding of the meaning of this concept of the abstracted form re-
siding intentionally in the soul of the knower, which he had re-deployed in 
the 1874 passage, with the more commonly accepted concept of ‘intention’ 
of the will and the associated striving after a goal (tendere in aliud) that is 
characteristic of intentional acts, remarking that,
This expression [‘the intentional inexistence of an object’] had been misunderstood 
in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. 
In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term 
‘intentional’ the Scholastics very frequently used the expression ‘objective’. This 
has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, 
and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely 
thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression ‘intentional’ 
because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being misunderstood 
if I had described the object of thought as ‘objectively existing,’ for modern-day 
thinkers [natural scientists] use this expression to refer to what really exists [qua 
the theoretical object of physics, e.g., molecular movements] as opposed to ‘mere 
subjective appearances’ [i.e., phenomenal colours, sounds, etc.].34 
Brentano, therefore, would lead us to believe, both in the 1874 passage and 
in the 1874 and 1911 notes, that he has not deviated, in any significant sense, 
from the meaning of the original Scholastic-Aristotelian concept of the ab-
stracted form of sense residing intentionally in the soul of the knower in 
his depiction of the way in which objects of consciousness exist as objects 
‘in some manner’ in consciousness.35 
This self-professed ‘similarity’ between Brentano and Aristotle’s doc-
trine of ‘intentional indwelling’ has been re-echoed by many commentators 
on this 1874 passage since, and has been favourably compared, for instance, 
to ‘St Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the relevant passage in Aristotle’s 
De Anima,’ where Thomas remarks,
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(S)ense receives the form without the matter, since form has a different mode of 
being in sense perception than it has in the sensible thing. For in the sensible thing 
it has natural being; but in sense perception it has intentional [or spiritual] being.36
There are, however, major differences between Brentano and the Schola-
stics on this issue, in particular regarding the knowability of the abstracted 
form of sense, to which attention needs to be drawn. 
First, Aristotle did not hold the view that ‘the sensed object without its 
matter’, when this is taken as a reference to the abstracted form of sense 
knowledge residing intentionally in the soul of the knower, is the imme-
diate and direct object of outer perceptual-sense knowledge, as Brentano 
himself clearly holds in the 1874 passage (and in his lectures on Descriptive 
Psychology). The immediate objects of sense knowledge for Aristotle and 
the Medieval Aristotelians are ‘physical things’ that exist ‘in the external 
world’ and their accidental modifications and properties that also exist ‘in 
the external world’, as Brentano had previously defended in The Psychology 
of Aristotle.37 The immediate objects of sense knowledge for Aristotle are 
not sensorially perceivable qualities (e.g. a colour, or a sound) that exist 
only as long as the actual acts of outer perceptual-sense experience exist, as 
Brentano now, following Locke, understands them in his 1874 study.38 This 
is why Hugh Lawson-Tancred (1986, 101–103) is correct to point out that 
for Aristotle the psychical indwelling of abstracted forms of sense cannot 
be regarded as an exclusive property of the human soul because while they 
exist in actuality in the knower’s soul ‘in a manner of speaking’ (however 
difficult that might be to fully understand) they also exist extra-mentally 
in potentiality as accidental modifications of substances in the world. In 
this regard, Tancred-Lawson (ibid., 104) is also correct to conclude that the 
‘intentional (or mental) in-existence’ of abstracted forms of sense ‘cannot be 
[for Aristotle] a hallmark of the sense object as such, as Brentano needs it’.39 
For Brentano, however, outside of the sense object as such, which is now 
understood by Brentano to be a Lockean secondary quality of outer percep-
tual-sense experience, such ‘physical phenomena’ (colours and sounds) do 
not exist like that at all ‘objectively’ in any real sense, as Aristotle and the 
medieval Aristotelians would have it, as accidents inhering in substances. 
They exist in actuality as light rays and sine waves; that is to say, they ex-
ist as the theoretically constructed and discovered objects of pure physics. 
This is stressed by Brentano throughout his 1874 study (and in the added 
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note in 1911 and in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology). Unlike Aristotle, 
therefore, Brentano can maintain in his new descriptive-psychological scheme of 
things that ‘the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object’, the sensed 
object qua physical phenomenon, in this instance, a colour or a sound as it 
occurs in its respective psychical-act experience, is an exclusive property of 
our actual acts of outer perceptual-sense experience.40 
The comparison, then, that Brentano operates in his 1874 passage is 
between the kind of existence that is characteristic of mental objects (qua 
abstracted forms of intelligibility) and what is characteristic of extra-mental 
real objects (whether the latter are treated as real accidental modifications 
of Aristotelian substances in the world, or as the theoretically constructed 
objects of physics). When considered as the immediate objects of con-
sciousness, the objects of sense and of thought (and of all psychical-act ex-
periences), according to Brentano, do not have ‘real’ substantial existence 
either inside or outside of the mind. They have, rather, ‘intentional ex-
istence (in the mentally active subject)’, in an analogous fashion to the way 
in which the abstracted form of sense or intentio or species is said to exist 
intentionally in the soul of the knower as maintained in Scholastic theory 
of knowledge (Spiegelberg 1936; 1976, p. 122). And since it is on account of 
the abstractive ability of human intellectual soul that the abstracted species 
has their existence at all, such intentional existence is entirely dependent on 
the activity of the individual’s intellectual soul just as Aristotle and the Aris-
totelians held (even if Brentano no longer subscribes to Aristotle’s particu-
lar view of abstraction and the active intellect). Thus the intentional objects 
qua the directly intended objects of experience, for Brentano, have the same 
kind of mental existence only as the abstracted forms of sense-knowledge 
are said to have in the intellectual soul of the knower.
Unlike St Thomas and the Scholastics, however, in his 1874 psychology 
Brentano regards this abstracted form of sense qua mental object of con-
sciousness, as the end term of outer perceptual-sense experience (that is, for 
Brentano, of sense judgement). Outside of the perceptual experience of 
immanent colours and sounds, there exist light rays and sine waves. From 
a descriptive-psychological point of view, then, this means for Brentano 
that colours and sounds have ‘only phenomenal and intentional [= mental] 
existence’ in comparison to the actual extra-mental existence of the theo-
retically constructed objects of physics. The theoretical objects of natural 
sciences, as a matter of established natural-scientific fact, in Brentano’s 
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view, really and truly exist. It thus now follows for Brentano in PES that 
our everyday normal acts of outer perceptual-sense experience of physical 
phenomena (e.g., of colours, etc.) are inherently and naturally misleading 
(Falschnehmung) because these acts take their objects (colours) to be exist-
ing ‘out there’ as, say, accidents of hylomorphically constituted substances, 
just as Aristotle and the Aristotelians would have it, when these objects 
(colours) do not exist like that at all, or as such, ‘out there’, extra-mentally. 
‘For this reason,’ Brentano concludes, ‘anyone who in good faith has taken 
them for what they seem to be is being misled by the manner in which the 
phenomena are connected.’41 
Brentano’s view that our acts of outer perceptual-sense experience, such 
as seeing colours or hearing sounds in the external world, are inherently de-
ceptive acts indicates just how unAristotelian and unScholastic Brentano’s 
views are in PES and in DP. In fact Brentano’s characterisation of our nor-
mal acts of outer perceptual-sense experience as being inherently deceptive 
is closer to St Thomas’s views on abnormal sense knowledge, for, as St 
Thomas writes, ‘(I)n the case of ourselves, deception comes about really 
in accordance with phantasia through which occasionally we cling to the 
likeness of things as if they were the things themselves, as is clear with people 
sleeping or the mad’.42 At any rate, in PES Brentano now holds that in our 
everyday normal and wakeful experience we think we are seeing colours 
and hearing sounds as features of an extra-mental reality when, in fact, 
these things themselves really and truly exist as light rays or light particles 
and sine waves, that it to say, as established by natural-scientific-theoretic 
investigation. Here, then, there is a realism to Brentano’s philosophy of 
mind, but it is not based upon his views on ‘intentionality’ or on any Aristo-
telian-Medieval realist philosophy; it is, rather, based upon his acceptance 
of some form of natural-scientific materialism.
Brentano’s self-interpretation in the notes to the 1874 passage and the 
1911 re-issue of his PES, indicating his concurrence with the Thomistic-
Aristotelian epistemological concept of the intentional indwelling of the 
‘sensed object without its matter’ (or impressed species) in the soul of the 
knower, and Spiegelberg’s and many other commentators’ re-iteration of 
this affinity, overlook major epistemological differences between the way 
in which ‘the intentional species’, qua abstracted form, is said to be present in 
the soul of the knower in the Thomistic-Aristotelian account and the way 
in which Brentano in the actual 1874 passage regards the direct knowability 
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of the intentional object of sense. This, nevertheless, is to be explained 
by the fact that in his 1874 study of psychology Brentano is not defend-
ing, or developing a Scholastic realist epistemology, but confining his at-
tention methodologically to a descriptive-psychological view of the things 
themselves, that is to say, to what occurs in the experiencing of an object 
given to an actual psychical-act experience. And he thinks that natural sci-
ence has demonstrated to us just how such things really and truly exist (as 
light rays etc.), when we are not directly aware of them. Hence, in tak-
ing colours to be real features of substances we are being ‘mis-taken’ in 
our ‘perceptions’.43 By 1874, therefore, Brentano has relinquished entirely 
any Aristotelian-epistemological theory of abstraction — with which, as 
Spiegelberg (1976, 122) correctly notes, ‘Brentano had concerned himself [my 
emphasis] a good deal’ in the mid 1860s — and, in its place, adopted a ver-
sion of direct mental (Cartesian–Lockean–Humean) representationalism 
against a background acceptance of the dominant natural-scientific world-
view as expressed in his time. These are Brentano’s (new) concerns in PES, 
as Bartok (2005, 443–4; 448–9) correctly reminds us. 
Where Brentano does agree with St Thomas and the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages in his 1874 passage, nonetheless, is with the general distinction 
that the Scholastics drew in their metaphysics between the intentional and 
natural orders of being — for Brentano, the (intended) objects of conscious-
ness have intentional, not real being. To understand this part of ‘Brentano’s 
(first) thesis’ we need to understand that metaphysical distinction.
In their metaphysics the Scholastics opposed the intentional order of 
being, (in) esse intentionale, to the natural order being, esse naturale or natu-
rae.44 Things, for example, can naturally exist in one another, and alongside 
one another, such as, for instance, matches in a matchbox, or water in a 
glass tumbler. By contrast, a thing existing intentionally in another being 
denotes a flowing and incomplete presence of the nature of one being in an-
other being, such as, for instance, the presence of the sun in daylight, or of a 
user of an instrument in the instrument used.45 This concept of ‘intentional 
indwelling’ denotes the way one thing exists in another thing not ‘really’, or 
‘solidly’, or ‘totally’, but flowing incompletely (fluens et incompleta). It is this 
concept of ‘intentional indwelling (or ‘intentional in-existence’ as Brentano 
refers to it in the 1874 passage) that is deployed in the Scholastic epistemo-
logical theory of the abstracted intelligible form or species. This abstracted 
form resides intentionally, as opposed to really, in the soul of the knower. 
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What this theory tries to explain, then, is how I can become a knower of 
physical things (i.e. abstract their forms) without becoming those real things 
themselves because the real form does not reside in the intellectual part of 
my soul, but an abstracted image or representative through which I know 
the physical thing resides intentionally, not really, in the intellectual soul of 
the knower.46 Just, then, as we are usually unaware of the words we use to 
discuss the reality of things around us, so too, according to the Scholastics, 
we are usually unaware of the abstracted intentions in our knowledge of 
things in the world. This is why Augustine likens such abstracted forms or 
images as ‘signs’ and as ‘Verbum Mentis’, and to which Brentano draws our 
attention in the note accompanying the 1874 passage in PES (1995a, 88 n.). 
For the Scholastics, the abstracted forms of sense are transparent ‘instru-
ments’ used in the knowing process of which we are directly unaware. Thus 
the Scholastics regarded such abstracted forms of sense are ‘blind instru-
ments’ used in that process. Brentano completely deviates from this posi-
tion in PES by making the ‘intentional object’ the directly intended object of 
perceptual experience. Sorabji (1991), therefore, is correct to conclude, that 
‘Brentano’s interpretation [in PES] was not faithful to Thomas, for whom 
intentional being did not imply awareness, although it may have implied a 
message’ (p. 248). Brentano, indeed, still maintains in PES that intentional 
objects of outer sense perception (e.g., colours) are ‘signs’, but they are not 
signs of physical things and their properties in the external world, they are 
rather signs of a theoretically constructed reality as determined via natural-
scientific interpretation (e.g., as light rays or light particles). 
In Scholastic epistemology, then, this intentional mode of in-dwelling 
of the abstracted form of sense in the soul of the knower is just one instance 
where an ‘intentional union’ takes place in the world between one entity 
(the knower’s soul) and another entity (the physical thing in the world 
which the knower comes to know) as many commentators have remarked, 
and as Brentano himself clearly reminds his reader in the extended footnote 
that he appended to the passage in 1874 upon its re-introduction.47 Such 
a mode of ‘being intentionally present in another’, nonetheless, whether 
this refers to the abstracted form residing intentionally in the soul of the 
knower or the intentional presence of sun in day light, is indeed a spiritual 
form of being.48 Yet it would be quite absurd for Aristotle or Thomas to 
consider such a spiritual (spiritale) mode of being as mental (mentale) ex-
istence (let alone as reducible exclusively to ‘the mental in-existence of an 
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object’, as Brentano would have it in the 1874 passage) precisely because 
such intentional indwelling (inesse intentionale) is a distinct mode of being 
from both the bodily or corporeal kind and the intellectual or mental kind.49
Intentional indwelling of an object in another object, for the Scholastics, 
then, simply denotes a different order of being to the natural order of being 
of things, namely, a flowing and incomplete spiritual presence of the iden-
tity of one being in another being. And indeed this is why the Scholastics 
could appeal to this very same concept, in their theology, as a way of trying 
to understand their faith (fides quaerens intellectum) in the mystery of the 
triune God, where the love of the Father for the Son and the love of the Son 
for the Father is manifested in and through the intentional indwelling of 
the Holy Spirit. Such an account of intentional union retains the notion of 
‘three persons’ ‘in’ the ‘one substance’, whilst dispelling the notion of three 
substances really existing in one substance (i.e., three Gods in one God), 
or the notion of one substance comprising three real distinct parts of one 
thing, with three interlocking real relations, making up a total of three real 
parts of the one God (i.e., each member of the Triune God being ‘really’ a 
third-part God). Brentano himself alludes to this theological deployment of 
the concept of intentional in-dwelling by St Augustine and the Scholastics 
in their reflections on the triune God, in the extended note that accompa-
nies the 1874 passage. 
If we turn to what Brentano says in the actual 1874 passage, however, 
here we find Brentano declaring ‘intentional inexistence’ to be exclusively a 
defining feature of our actual psychical-act experiences. Such is not the case 
in Scholasticism. ‘Intentional being’ or ‘intentional in-dwelling’ is a feature 
that is discernible in the relationship between many things throughout the 
cosmos. The intentional presence of the sun in daylight is not a ‘psychical 
phenomenon’, nor is the presence of the woodcutter in the axe used to 
fell the tree (Alberston 1954), nor is the intentional indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit in the love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father. 
In the 1874 passage, therefore, Brentano literally modifies the entire scope 
and application of the Scholastic concept of ‘intentional in-dwelling’ to de-
signate one thing, and one thing only, namely, the kind of mind-dependent-
existence that is characteristic of the immediate contents of the actual acts 
present in human consciousness. Thus Brentano now understands the con-
cept of ‘intentional inexistence’ as picking out an exclusive property of the 
(directly intended) ‘mental objects’ of one’s own actual acts of consciousness 
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and that does not designate real substantial existence of one object (the in-
tended object of an experience, e.g., a sound I hear) and another object (the 
psychical-act experience itself, i.e., the act of hearing). Because the inten-
tional object qua intended object of any actual psychical-act experience, un-
ivocally speaking, does not have real, substantial existence, Brentano thinks 
he is justified in appealing to ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle ages called 
the intentional (or mental) in-existence of objects’ as the defining feature 
of psychical-act experiences themselves. In effect what Brentano has done, 
without knowing it, is to add a new meaning to the Scholastic concept of 
‘intentional indwelling’. It now means ‘the mental in-existence of an object’ 
or ‘immanent objectivity’ in consciousness which is not to be understood 
as an object existing either really inside or really outside of the mind, yet 
as an object that is dependent for its spiritual existence on the activity of 
one’s own actual consciousness itself. This is why Brentano can take the 
terms (1) ‘intentional inexistence’, (2) ‘mental inexistence’, and (3) ‘imma-
nent objectivity’ all to be synonymous expressions describing the content 
of psychical-act experiences (something not possible for the Scholastics). 
Brentano, indeed, appears to have been so successful in this re-deployment 
and reduction of the original Scholastic metaphysical concept of ‘(in)esse 
intentionale’ to an exclusive descriptive-psychological principle designating 
the mode of being of the contents of a ‘mentally active subject’ in PES that 
this is probably why some commentators in the philosophy of mind today 
believe, incorrectly, that this is what the original Scholastic concept means, 
or even ‘part of one well-known medieval account of intentionality’ (Lyons 
1995, 1).
From an ontological point of view, nevertheless, Brentano’s descriptive-
psychological thesis of intentionality in the 1874 passage relies entirely upon 
the Scholastic metaphysical insight into ‘intentionality’ as a mode of being 
that must not be metaphysically confused with, nor identified to the actual natu-
ral mode of being of any real thing (res) existing inside or outside of the mind. 
Remarkably, this scholastic metaphysical distinction still continues to play 
a critical role in Husserl’s celebrated reduction of the natural attitude to the 
transcendental-phenomenological attitude in Ideas I (1913) where the entire 
world of things that are given (known) to acts of outer percep tual-sense ex-
perience is (in)famously described by Husserl as having ‘only’ an ‘intention-
al’ mode of being ‘for a consciousness’ in opposition to the way in which the 
person living in the natural attitude naively and erroneously understands 
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the world of things given to outer perception as having real, actual, inde-
pendent existence and meaning in themselves, whether one’s attention is 
directed toward them or not. Thus it turns out to be the case that what the 
Scholastics of the Middle-Ages distinguished in their general metaphysical 
reflections between the intentional and natural orders of  being not only 
determines a significant part of Brentano’s thesis of intentionality in the 
1874 passage but this distinction is also still alive and well, teaching the later 
Husserl how to see, properly, from a phenomenological point of view, the 
mode of being of the entire world of things given to our actual acts of 
outer perceptual-sense experience for what it is, namely, as an intentional 
correlate of experience. What is, however, problematical with ‘Brentano’s 
thesis’ is not the ‘spooky’ ontological implications of what consciousness is 
a consciousness of, nor its scholastic terminology, but the dualistic meta-
physics of human subjectivity comprising a lucid mind and an opaque body 
underpinning Brentano’s elaboration of his discovery of the intentionality 
of consciousness.50 A successful elaboration of this tenet of consciousness 
in philosophy of mind, then, lies outside of natural  science, Cartesian-
Lockean metaphysics, and naturalistic conceptualizations of what it is to 
be a human being.
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Notes
1 Brentano 1995a, 180–181 n.
2 This paper was first read at the Conference on ‘Consciousness and Intention-
ality: Franz Brentano’s Heritage in Philosophy of Mind’, held at the Univer-
sity of Salzburg, on 8 Feb., 2013. I would like to thank the participants of the 
Conference for their questions and, in particular, conversations that I had with 
Johannes Brandl, Mark Textor, Barry Dainton and Ion Tănăsescu. I hope this 
revised and slightly extended version of the paper goes towards addressing 
some of the questions and issues they raised.
3 Cf. Hedwig 1979.
4 Brentano 1975a, 14.
5 Hence Bartok’s (2005, 443) remark, ‘(T)o a surprising degree, Brentano’s em-
piricism [in PES and DP] is recognizably a descendant of Locke’s’, and of 
Hume’s, too, we must add, for, Brentano follows Hume’s lead that percep-
tion can be understood as that which is perceived (the ‘impression’ in Hume’s 
sense) in the mind as well as the act of perceiving: ‘(N)othing is ever present to 
the mind but its perceptions; and [...] all the actions of seeing, hearing [...] fall 
under its denomination. The mind may never exert itself in any action which 
may not be comprehended under the term of perception’ (Hume 1967, p. 456). 
Before Hume and Locke, Aquinas did remark: ‘Our mind knows itself not by 
its own substance but by its activities — and through a consideration of those 
activities man can come to a general understanding of the mind’s nature — but 
that requires diligent and subtle investigation’ (Summa Theologiae, 1a. q. 87. 
a.1). Unlike Locke and Hume, however, for Aquinas, the mind can only know 
itself secondarily and not immediately or directly through such considerations. 
Brentano in fact did hold this position in his 1866 habilitation thesis The Psy-
chology of Aristotle: ‘(A)lthough it [the intellect] knows itself, it does not know 
itself either always or in the beginning, but only secondarily’ (1975a, 88, my 
emphasis). In PES, then, Brentano follows Locke and Hume’s approach, and 
not Aquinas and Aristotle’s.
6 Brentano 1995a, 311–314 (Appendix XII ‘Thinking is Universal, Entities are 
Individual [Dictated 1917]’).
7 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I–II, 12, 1c., quoted by Marras (1976, 135, n. 26). 
What Marras does not point out to the reader is that St Thomas supplies this 
etymological elucidation of the term ‘intentio’ in a question that is devoted to 
the human will, and not in an account of cognition as this author intimates. 
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Cf. Simonin (1930). What Marras, nonetheless, defends in ‘Scholastic Roots 
of Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality’ is the Scholastic epistemological po-
sition, and not Brentano’s account. Thus the major conceptual discrepancies 
between the Scholastic view and Brentano’s ‘new’ thesis of intentionality are 
neither noted nor addressed in his paper. A similar absence is present in Rung-
galdier’s (1989) ‘On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of “Intentionality” in 
Brentano’ and in a more recent article by Jacquete (2004), who seems to ap-
prove of Marras’ treatment of Brentano’s thesis (cf. Ibid., 125, n. 5). Hence the 
changes that Brentano actually makes to the scholastic meaning of intentional-
ity do not feature in this paper either.
8 Brentano 1969, 151 (Appendix IX ‘Loving and Hating’, Dictation, May 19, 
1907).
9 Simonin 1930, 452.
10 Thus we find the following expressions among the Scholastics depicting this 
concept of intention in terms of: ‘intentio finis, finis intentus, id quod agens 
intendit’ (Ibid., 447). 
11 This is an important concept that comes from the Scholastics, and it is the 
same concept of ‘intent’ that Brentano’s audience of his 1889 lecture would 
have heard, discussed and disputed in courts of law.
12 Ibid., 453.
13 Simonin 1930, 452.
14 See, infra, n. 38.
15 Passmore 1957, 178.
16 Brentano 1995a, 102.
17 Brentano 1969, 19–20, my emphasis.
18 See, PES, Book II, §§ 5–9.
19 See, Hume, 1896 [1739], 2n., 8, 60, and 73.
20 Descartes 1997, 143 (my emphasis).
21 Brentano 1995a, 155–176, esp., 162–164.
22 Ibid., 209–210. 
23 Ibid., 88. 
24 De Boer 1978, 6.
25 Ibid.
26 Twardowski’s account has been very influential. One commentator, for exam-
ple, after quoting Brentano’s 1874 passage of PeS In full, immediately quotes a 
passage from Twardowski’s 1894 study as a gloss on Brentano’s 1874 passage, 
and then proceeds to elucidate Brentano’s 1874 passage in light of elements 
that Twardowski distinguishes between ‘relation to a content’ and ‘direction to 
an object’ (Moran, ‘Brentano’s Thesis’, 1996, 2) — a distinction which Brenta-
no does not operate in his 1874 PES. This is not to suggest that Twardowski’s 
version is not a better version than Brentano’s, in many respects it is; but it is 
not ‘the actual views of the historical Brentano’ which this commentator says 
he wishes to address (ibid.). This, nonetheless, probably explains why Moran 
(2005, 57) attributes to Brentano the view that ‘Brentano held a model of the 
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intentional relation, which may be illustrated as follows: psychic act – inten-
tionally relates to – immanent objectivity (may or may not be [a] real thing).’ 
According to this commentator (Moran 1996, 2), Brentano’s more immediate 
students (Twardowski and Husserl are named together) interpret ‘Brentano’s 
thesis’ more faithfully than later analytic commentators who follow R.M. 
Chisholm’s ‘influential account’ elaborated in the 1960s.
27 According to Spiegelberg (1994, 97), ‘it is only in Husserl’s thought that the 
term “intentional” acquired the meaning of directedness toward an object rath-
er than that of the object’s immanence in consciousness’. This repeats his point 
from his earlier 1936 article, ‘“Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, 
Brentano and Husserl’ (in McAlister, 1976, 122). Simons (1995a, xix) exercises 
a similar viewpoint, in his ‘Introduction to the Second Edition’ of the re-print 
of the English translation of Brentano’s PES, believing that it is Brentano’s 
students (Höfler, Meinong, and Twardowski), rather than Brentano himself, 
who are responsible for the unScholastic conception of ‘intentional act’ being 
promulgated in the 1890s. Moran (2000, 482, n. 80) agrees with Spiegelberg 
and Simons, noting that, ‘(T)he technical term intentionalitas did have currency 
in the late Middle Ages, and used to refer to the character of the logical dis-
tinction between prima and secunda intentio, but the modern use of the term 
intentionality owes to Husserl and not Brentano’. Brentano, however, does 
refer to ‘intentional relation’ in his lectures on DP in the 1880s. Husserl, at 
any rate, credits Brentano with the discovery of the object-relatedness of acts 
of consciousness and himself with working out the theory of the ‘constitution’ 
of the meaning of objects in consciousness which Brentano does not elaborate. 
See Husserl 1968, ‘§ 3d Brentano als Wegbereiter für die Forschung in innerer 
Erfahrung — Enkdeckung der Intentionalität als Grundcharakter des Psychi-
schen’, 31–35.
28 Because there is a ‘real’, ‘natural unity’ of ‘acts’ and their ‘[intended] objects’ 
in consciousness, a descriptive science of the way in which the acts of conscious-
ness present those objects is possible. Thus Brentano’s account of the ‘unity of 
consciousness’ in PES Book II, Chapter IV ‘On the Unity of Consciousness’ 
(1995a, 155–76) is of pivotal significance to his project of a descriptive science 
of psychical phenomena in general. Thinkers as diverse as William James and 
Husserl, despite their different views from Brentano on this matter, agreed 
with Brentano (1995a, 163) that ‘this tenet [of the unity of consciousness] has 
been misunderstood [my emphasis] by both its supporters and its opponents’ in 
modern philosophical and natural-scientific psychology.
29 Brentano 1995a, 88–89. By ‘physical phenomena’ Brentano means the sensori-
ally perceived qualities (e.g. sounds, colours, odours etc.) of actual acts of outer 
perceptual-sense experience (ibid., 79–80; 92–94; 112–113; 175–176). Bren-
tano, however, also uses the term ‘physical phenomena’ for the theoretically 
constructed objects of natural science, e.g., ‘molecular movements’ and ‘forces’ 
discovered in pure physics that exist ‘really (wirklich) and truly’ outside of in-
tentional consciousness (ibid., 98–100). These objects, nonetheless, are not 
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directly experienced, and so, strictly speaking, are not ‘phenomena’. Because 
his use of the term ‘physical phenomena’ is ambiguous, it is of importance 
to identify which meaning he is appealing to when interpreting his views on 
‘physical phenomena’.
30 Ibid., 138, my emphasis.
31 Ibid., p. 102, my emphasis.
32 Heidegger will unravel the etymology of this same German word differently, 
emphasizing the awareness of being – like others before him, such as Karl 
Marx – and find support and corroboration therein also in the same term for an 
alternative definition and conception of ‘phenomenology’, one that privileges my 
understanding of being as determining what my intentional consciousness is ‘a 
consciousness of’. As Heidegger (1956, 215) rhetorically raises and answers the 
question in ‘My Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics’ (originally com-
posed and published in 1949 as an ‘Introduction’ to the fifth reprint of ‘What 
is Metaphysics?’ (1929): ‘What else could  be the meaning — if anybody has 
ever seriously thought about this — of the word sein in the [German] words 
Bewußtsein and Selbstbewußtsein if it did not designate the existential nature 
of that which is in the mode of existence.’ This, however, would be to miss 
the point that Brentano wishes to make in PES about the term ‘Bewußtsein’, 
namely, that consciousness cannot but exist for the being who is conscious — the 
latter is ‘the wonder of all wonders’ as Husserl would later stress in his phe-
nomenology. Such word-support of course does not work for the English term 
‘consciousness’; the latter expression stems from the Latin, ‘con’ (together) and 
‘scire’ (to know), as in having shared knowledge with others, and so, is linked 
to ‘moral conscience’ (conscientiae). In a court of law, for instance, when one is 
charged with ‘being conscious of the fact’, or of being ‘an accessory after the 
fact (factum)’, one is being charged with being an accomplice, or with being a 
witness to the deed done (factum) by somebody else. Thus the Latin phrase 
‘conscius sibi’ is translated into English as ‘conscious to oneself’, and it is with 
such an ‘internal court testimony’ that Descartes uses the term ‘conscientia’ in 
his starting-point of his philosophical analysis of the mind. Brentano follows 
Descartes. Heidegger (1927), in Sein und Zeit, affirms the priority of my ac-
tual individual ‘existence’ (in the strong Kierkegaardian existentialist sense) 
as being-in-the-world and the significance of that being’s understanding and 
concern for its own individual being. Thus Heidegger follows Kierkegaard, 
not Brentano (or Husserl).
33 Brentano 1995a, 88 n. English translation of ‘mental inexistence’ for ‘psychische 
Einwohnung’ changed to ‘psychical indwelling’. 
34 Ibid., 180–181 n. Cf., Spiegelberg, 1976, 120–21.
35 In his paper on ‘“Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano 
and Husserl’, Spiegelberg agrees with Brentano’s self-interpretation on this 
issue and thereby misses the significant changes that Brentano actually makes 
to this concept of ‘intentional indwelling’ ([in]esse intentionale) in Scholastic 
metaphysics.
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36 McAlister 2004, 153. 
37 See, Brentano (1975a), esp., ‘Part III. Of the Sensitive Soul’, 54–74, and compare 
this to any passage in PES where Brentano talks about ‘physical  phenomena’.
38 In Scholastic realism, acts of sensation are not, automatically, acts of sense 
cognition, though the latter acts are dependent upon the first and a result of 
a co-operation between acts of sensation and acts of cognition in the knower. 
See, supra, n. 4. 
39 In his earlier 1862 doctoral dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristo-
tle, Brentano defends this realist underpinnings of things in nature (in terms 
of their accidental modifications of substances) in his treatment of ‘being in 
the sense of the true’ in the Scholastic-Aristotelian account of adequatio rei 
et intellectus. Quoting Aristotle from Metaphysics IX. 10, 1051b6-8, Brentano 
(1975b, 19) writes: ‘You are not white because we believe truthfully that you 
are white. Rather because you are white, we, who say it, speak the truth.’ Bren-
tano, however, no longer subscribes to this position in his 1874 PES as outer 
(sense) perception is now regarded as inherently mis-leading (Falschnehmung). 
See, infra, n. 43, and corresponding reference in PES and my comment.
40 Brentano’s stress on the intended object of outer perceptual-sense experience 
as an exclusive property of one’s own psychical-act experiences leads to the 
question of the reducibility or irreducibility of the physical to the psychical 
in Brentano’s account that has either occupied or vexed many analytic com-
mentators on ‘Brentano’s thesis’. Cf., Moran’s (1996, 27) conclusion that ‘those 
who invoke Brentano as guardian of mental irreducibility are just plain wrong’. 
Brentano, however, does not equate the brain with the mind (PES 1995a, 36; 
DP 1995b, 4) and holds the view that access to our consciousness is peculiarly 
direct, clear and certain by comparison to anything else (especially the aware-
ness of one’s own body). Thus Brentano admits some mode of being of (con-
scious) experience that is qualitatively irreducible to physical reality, however 
incorrect his views on incarnate consciousness are or his implicit dualistic met-
aphysics of human subjectivity as comprising a lucid mind and an opaque body 
is. 
41 Brentano 1995a, 91.
42 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, 54, 5, quoted by Marras (1976, 134), my empha-
sis.
43 Husserl was sharply critical of Brentano’s use and appeal to knowledge from 
natural science as ‘evidence’ against immediate descriptions in Brentano’s ela-
boration of his novel idea of a science of descriptive psychology which requires 
one, methodologically, to turn away from all hypothetical theories and give due 
attention to ‘the things themselves’ of experience.
44 Cf., Simonin 1930, 456, and de Boer 1978, 44.
45 Quoting Aquinas, Hayen (1942, 98) remarks, ‘Instrumentalis virtus […] est flu-
ens et incompleta in esse naturae.’ Hence, as Hayen (ibid.) comments, ‘La virtus 
instumentalis, ensuite, ne possède qu’une réalité fugitive, ‘fluide’, mouvante, et 
pour ainsi dire ‘spirituelle’ au sens primitif du mot, qui oppose l’inconsistance 
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d’un souffle aérien à la solidité du corps robuste et résistant’. Cf., also, James S. 
Alberston 1954.
46 Marras (1976, 131) puts this point well for the Scholastics, when he notes, ‘(T)
o say an object exists formally (immaterially, intentionally, etc.) in the subject 
is merely to say that the form of the object exists in the subject (‘Lapis autem 
non est in anima, sed forma lapidis’). […] As the Scholastics put it, the form 
of the object exists in the subject as an attribute or modification of the subject 
(sicut accidens in subiecto). […] And, as any student of scholastic philosophy well 
knows, the form thus exemplified — the species — is not that which is (directly) 
known [id quod cognoscitur], but that by means of which the extramental object 
is known [id quo cognoscitur].’ This, however, is not the philosophical position 
that Brentano actually holds in the 1874 PES passage because the intentional 
object is now regarded by Brentano as that which is directly known.
47 Cf., Hayen 1942, 35–7.
48 Ibid., 98.
49 See, Watson 1988, 141. 
50 Brentano’s modification of the Scholastic concept of esse intentionale in PES 
to mean the spiritual indwelling of an object in consciousness and its peculiar 
ontological status of mind-dependent-existence is one of the major sources 
of criticism that is laboured against ‘Brentano’s thesis’, especially from some 
analytic philosophers who believe that ‘a successful analysis of intentionality 
will show such spooky ontological talk to have been unnecessary’ (Bartok 2005, 
441, my emphasis). 
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